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THE  UK’s  CLIMATE  CHANGE  LEVY: 
IS IT WORKING? 
 
 




Is the UK government’s Climate Change Levy (CCL) influencing British companies 
to become more energy efficient and to use clean renewable energy sources? This 
Article reviews briefly the arguments for using energy taxes in environmental policy. 
It explains the structure and operation of the CCL designed to reduce consumption 
of fossil fuels. The Article examines the CCL’s implementation and considers the 
results of several empirical studies including a survey undertaken by Chanwai of the 
response of businesses in the Northwest of England. Finally, the Article proposes ways 
to redesign the CCL to enable it to more effectively support environmental goals. 
In recent years, energy activities have surfaced from the relative backwaters of UK 
environmental regulation to occupy a central policy-making concern. The reason is 
climate change. As the scientific prognosis of global warming has firmed, and 
evidence of the likely economic and ecological ramifications become better 
understood, authorities in the UK and abroad have sought new instruments to 
control rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the main 
culprit, accounting for over three-quarters of Britain’s relevant emissions.1 The 
government’s Climate Change Programme launched in November 20002 and 
coordinated by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), sketches how the UK intends to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitment of 
a 12.5% reduction on 1990 levels of all GHGs by 2012, and achievement of the 
separate domestic goal of a 20% cut in CO2  emissions below 1990 levels by 2010. 
Electricity generation is a major source of GHG emissions. The UK’s electricity 
 
consumption jumped by 16% from 1990 to 1999, although actual CO2 emissions 
declined because of the ‘dash for gas’ and improved performance of nuclear 
generation.3 The switch to gas, however, was a fortuitous event, and the 
government has conceded: ‘the UK’s energy sector is still largely reliant on fossil 
fuels and, unless they can be replaced by plants with low or no emissions, this 
dependence will increase after 2010 as existing nuclear power stations reach the 
end of their licensed lifetimes’.4 The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP) has advised that CO2 reductions of 60% by 2050 are necessary if Britain is to 
avoid dangerous climate change.5 The Kyoto targets simply reflect what was 
politically feasible at the time and not what is appropriate from an ecological 
standpoint.6 
The thrust of the government’s plan to promote energy efficiency and expand the 
role of renewables is to change corporate behaviour through economic instruments.7 
The key policy tools are the CCL, a Carbon Emissions Trading System (CETS), and 
a structure for trading in renewable energy supply obligations. The CETS is an 
experimental, voluntary regime and, like the tradeable ‘Renewables  Obligations’, 
only very recently came into effect, making analysis somewhat premature at this 
stage. So far, the CCL is the government’s primary weapon for tackling fossil fuel 
emissions. The Levy focuses on the industry sector, although it accounts for a minority 
of Britain’s GHG emissions: transport is the biggest scourge, accounting for some 
34% of final energy use, followed by households (29%) industry and services (23%) 
and agriculture (14%).8 The growing dependence on economic instruments as a 
means of energy policy is based on a number of assumptions about the effectiveness 
of such instruments. 
2. Environmental Taxation 
2.1 Development of Eco-Taxes 
In many jurisdictions, including the UK, economic instruments have become an 
increasingly fashionable environmental policy tool.9 During the 1990s several 
 
European Union (EU) states, particularly in Scandinavia, introduced carbon and 
energy taxes to control GHG emissions,10 although the European Commission’s 
proposal for a EU-wide tax failed to garner sufficient support, primarily because of 
international trade competition concerns given the absence of such a tax in the 
United States.11 Although ‘eco-tax’ proposals in the mid-1990s were grounded in 
Australia12  and the United States,13 recently some governments have become more 
tolerant of environmental taxation, such as New Zealand, which in April 2002 
announced plans for a new carbon charge.14 Nonetheless, eco-taxation remains 
often controversial; for instance, in December 2000 the French Constitutional 
Court nullified the government’s extension of the pollution tax to consumption of 
fossil fuels and electricity.15 Two decades of market deregulation in the West has 
left energy and environmental taxes in many countries at levels relatively lower 
than they were 20 years ago.16 
Although the UK has been wedded to planning controls and licensing for managing 
environmental pressure, as early as 1992 the government proclaimed, ‘in future there 
will be a general presumption in favour of economic instruments’.17 Subsequently, 
the government introduced the landfill tax (1996) and amended company car 
taxation (2000), but abandoned plans for a pesticides tax.18 The 1999 Sustainable 
Development Strategy promised: ‘the Government will explore the scope for 
using economic instruments, such as taxes and charges, to deliver more sustainable 
development. Such measures can promote change, innovation and efficiency, and 
higher environmental standards’.19 The Treasury’s 1997 Statement of Intent on 
Environmental Taxation posited key principles for the design of taxation reforms, 
beginning with that ‘polluters should face the true costs which their actions impose 
on society’. However, the government’s rhapsody for economic instruments has been 
tempered by the realisation that market tools can have unwelcome social and 
economic side-effects. The Treasury’s Statement acknowledged that the polluter 
pays principle should be subject to several qualifications, including, that: ‘the social 
consequences of environmental taxation must be acceptable’; and ‘environmental 
 
policies must not threaten the competitiveness of UK business’. 
The genesis of the CCL can be found in academic and policy studies dating from 
the 1960s. There exists a plethora of literature on the potential of taxes (and other 
economic instruments) to contribute to more efficient and more effective 
environmental policy.20 Compared to traditional command regulation involving 
technology or emissions licensing standards, eco-taxes and tradeable emission 
allowances may enable society to achieve a given environmental outcome at a 
lower economic cost, or achieve a superior environmental outcome at the same 
cost.21 Interest in economic approaches to environmental regulation arose among 
academic circles in the 1960s, influenced by the pioneering theories of Pigou and 
Coase.22 In the 1970s, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) advanced the concept of the ‘polluter pays’ principle (PPP) as a basis for 
removing hidden subsidies that gave an unfair competitive advantage to polluting 
industries.23 In the 1980s and 1990s, under the influence of the sustainable 
development discourse, the PPP was repackaged into the more broad-based 
‘internationalisation of environmental costs’ principle.24 The EU Treaty was 
amended to provide that ‘the polluter should pay’ principle be a basis of 
Community policy on the environment.25 
A number of Scandinavian and other European countries have adopted energy 
taxes (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden).26 
These have often taken the form of extended systems of fuel excises in which rates 
of tax are defined for each fuel with regard to fuel quantity and approximation of 
carbon content (see Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and Denmark). 
Further, the level of tax can vary according to the type of energy user; in Sweden 
and the Netherlands, much lower rates of tax apply to industrial energy users 
than to electricity consumed by private households. Although the highest taxes 
have been adopted by Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, some existing energy taxes 
were reduced at the time of the new taxes and all three countries offer 
substantial tax relief to industry. On the other hand, the smaller energy taxes 
 
imposed by Finland and the Netherlands make fewer concessions to industry. 
Significantly, none of the above five countries has significant domestic coal 
production, and several derive most of their electricity from hydropower. 
Consequently, international competitiveness concerns would not have weighed as 
heavily in these countries as they have in Australia or the United  States.27 
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Eco-Taxes 
From the standpoint of environmental policy, eco-taxes may be attractive for several 
reasons.28 Firstly, eco-taxes can promote efficiency gains through reallocation of 
pollution (e.g. carbon) abatement costs and through performance incentives. The 
costs of pollution reduction typically vary among firms (known as different ‘marginal 
costs of abatement’),  and  efficient  businesses  should  seek  to  lower  their  tax  
burden  by investing in clean production technologies where this is most cost 
effective.29 Other policy instruments such as pollution licenses cannot be readily 
tailored to reflect each polluter’s abatement or energy management costs.30 
Secondly, eco-taxes provide innovation incentives; they can give polluters an 
ongoing incentive to seek more efficient ways (e.g. technological innovations or 
recycling) to reduce emissions or save energy, whereas there is little financial 
incentive to do better once prescribed environmental standards are met.31 Thirdly, 
eco-taxes should be less vulnerable to regulatory capture compared to command 
regulation; where regulators attempt to set differentiated company-by-company 
targets they must acquire the necessary information about each firm’s abatement or 
technology characteristics, which creates a risk for regulators of getting drawn into 
negotiations and the making of concessions to industry as a price for their 
cooperation.32 Eco-taxes can take account of all businesses’ differing pollution 
abatement costs without the need to consider the particular circumstances of 
individual firms. Fourthly, eco-taxes can also generate substantial revenues that 
can be recycled for environmental improvement investments. However, the revenue 
of an eco-tax is coincidental, and should decrease where a tax is ‘ecologically 
optimal’.33 
 
Apart from the environmental benefits, eco-taxes may yield economic and political 
advantages. When eco-taxes are introduced as part of systematic revision of a nation’s 
tax system, with corresponding reductions in income and employment taxes—known 
in the literature as ‘ecological tax reform’—there may also arise the benefits of jobs 
growth and economic investment (the ‘double dividend’ hypothesis).34 Secondly, it has 
been argued that using taxes and other economic instruments has democratic 
benefits in that enables the public to focus on the fundamental questions of what 
level of pollution at what cost is socially desirable rather than obfuscate such issues 
when the public is expected to focus on the minutiae of pollution licensing.35 
Eco-taxes, along with other economic instruments, are not however without 
potentially significant limitations. Unlike quantitative pollution regulation (or 
tradeable emission permits operating within a pollution cap), eco-taxes suffer from 
the drawback that they have uncertain environmental effects. The level of pollution 
reduction engendered flows from companies’ responses to the financial incentive of 
the tax, and it is difficult to model in advance what level of taxation is necessary 
to provoke a particular environmental effect.36   Secondly, in large decentralised 
companies with specialised branches, decisions made by responsible units regarding 
desired pollution abatement or energy saving efforts in response to eco-taxes may 
not be effectively imparted to all arms of the business. Large firms may also be 
preoccupied with other priorities, causing them to disregard small environmental 
taxes as just another business cost. Thirdly, eco-taxes and other economic 
instruments usually require significant re-regulation to ensure their proper 
functioning and enforcement. Economic instruments do not necessarily mean cost-
reducing market deregulation, and arrangements for monitoring and enforcing 
economic instruments can be complex and expensive.37 Fourthly, in the absence of 
international environmental tax harmonisation, eco-taxes levied on one country’s 
industry may also damage that country competitively by making foreign imports 
relatively cheaper if competitor countries have no similar taxes.38 Some existing 
academic research however suggests that such fears may be exaggerated.39 Fifthly, 
 
eco-taxes can collide with social policy concerns, primarily when the poor are 
disproportionately affected because a larger share of their income is spent on taxed  
items such as  heating or lighting fuel.40 Compensatory payments can be made, 
although this increases administrative complexity. And finally, arguments have 
been made by Sagoff and others that using market-based policy mechanisms 
wrongly bases environmental decisions on people’s ‘consumer’ preferences rather, 
as they assert should be the case, people’s ‘citizen’ preferences given the political 
and ethical issues at stake.41 
On balance, there would appear to be a role for eco-taxes and other economic 
instruments as a means of environmental policy, but that the justification for using 
eco-taxes depends on the specific environmental problem and the prevailing market 
and institutional characteristics. Environmental policy-makers cannot rely on 
economic instruments to make fundamental judgements about environmental 
strategy: overall environmental quality objectives should be democratically 
determined by government, such as sustainable CO2 loads in the atmosphere.42 
Successful applications of eco-taxes hinge on careful design and 
implementation—there is a considerable jump from theoretical principles to 
effective practical applications. Problems may arise if tax structures are too 
complex (hence costly to administer) or if tax incentives are insufficiently large to 
spur changes in firms’ or individuals’ behaviour. The political feasibility of new eco-
taxes must also be addressed at this stage.43 Eco-taxes are likely to be most valuable, 
suggests Smith, ‘where wide-ranging changes in behaviour are needed across a 
large number of production and consumption activities’.44 In such circumstances, 
the alternative of direct source-by-source regulation would likely generate 
unacceptable high costs. However, it is important to recognise that rarely is it a 
dichotomous choice between economic instruments and command regulation. 
Grabosky and Gunningham remind us that: ‘single instrument . . . approaches are 
misguided . . . [and] that in the large majority of circumstances (though certainly not 
all), a mix of instruments is required, tailored to specific policy goals’.45 Solutions to 
 
climate change and sustainable energy use in particular entail numerous economic 
sectors and actors, each of which needs a combination of policy instruments. 
3. The Climate Change Levy 
3.1 Development of the Levy and its Structure 
In his March 1998 Budget, the Chancellor announced a review into the suitability of 
a tax on the industrial and commercial use of energy.46 The resulting Lord Marshall 
report recommended that both taxation and tradeable emission permits could assist 
the UK to reduce its GHG emissions, but it favoured an early introduction of a 
compulsory energy tax, coupled with a pilot tradeable emissions scheme pending 
further investigation of this option until international trading formally began.47 Lord 
Marshall favoured a tax based on energy consumption (excluding renewables) rather 
than the carbon content of fuels, partly because of difficulties measuring the 
equivalent CO2 content of electricity generated from various primary fuels.48 
Marshall also cautioned that an energy tax should not be imposed on the domestic 
sector (due to fuel poverty concerns) and that ‘any measures must be subject to 
careful design in order to protect the competitiveness of British industry and 
maximise their environmental benefit’.49 
Plans for the CCL, which were mooted in the Chancellor’s March 1999 Budget,50 
generally followed the recommendations of Lord Marshall.51 The energy intensive 
chemical and steel industries were among the most critical of the CCL proposal,52 
predicting a disproportionate burden on manufacturing and adverse international 
competitiveness effects.53 But many businesses consulted accepted a role for energy 
taxation; the Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment favoured a 
longterm policy framework within which UK businesses could deliver carbon savings 
costeffectively without harm to business competitiveness.54 Following two years of 
consultation,55 the Levy was adjusted with inclusion of some additional financial 
concessions, as outlined below, which appeared to be broadly acceptable to 
industry.56 The structure of the Levy also proved to be acceptable to the European 
 
Commission’s Competition Directorate.57 
The CCL was introduced as a ‘downstream’ energy tax based primarily on 
industrial use of energy rather than an ‘upstream’ carbon tax on energy suppliers. 
Implemented through Schedule 6 of the Finance Act 2000 and collected by HM 
Customs and Excise, the Levy applies to energy used by industry and the public 
sector, but not to energy consumed in households, transportation or registered 
charities. Also exempt are small businesses using limited amounts of energy 
equivalent to ‘domestic use’. Further, horticulturist businesses, recognised by the 
government as a ‘special case’ high-energy user, enjoy a 50% discount for up to 
five years. Not all fuels are taxed; renewable energy (with the exception of large 
scale hydropower greater than 10MW) is exempt so as to encourage businesses to 
opt for non-fossil fuels. Suppliers of exempt renewable energies must hold a Levy 
Exemption Certificate, issued by the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets. Also 
exempt is approved combined heat and power (CHP), which is a recycled low-
carbon energy form, fuels used as a feedstock, and electricity harnessed in 
electrolysis processes (e.g. in aluminium smelting). Electricity from nuclear power, 
although not a fossil fuel, is subject to the CCL— arguably an appropriate 
measure given that nuclear power poses its own environmental problems and to 
exempt nuclear energy would have encouraged more investment in this sector at 
the expense of the fledgling renewables market. The CCL does not apply to oils 
already subject to excise duties. The current CCL rates include 0.15 p/kWh for gas, 
coal and coke, and 0.43 p/kWh for electricity, and the Levy is set to rise year-on-
year, although no rise was made on its 2002 anniversary. The CCL is added to 
energy consumers’ bills before VAT and has increased on average by 15% the 
energy bills of businesses. 
3.2 Levy Concessions 
The CCL was advanced on a fiscally revenue neutral basis at a macroscopic level, 
although not necessarily revenue neutral at the level of individual firms, through a 
0.3% reduction in all employers’ national insurance contributions (NICs). Such a 
 
financial design reflects principles of ecological tax reform. The latter has been 
defined as ‘shifting taxation off the value-adding activities of people (employment, 
enterprise and investment) onto the value-subtracting use of energy and resources 
and associated creation of wastes and pollution’.58 It is an approach endorsed by the 
UK’s Sustainable Development Strategy 1999,59 and the  European  Commission.60 
The German government has gone the furthest in ecological tax reform:61  under the 
1999 Law Initiating the Ecological Tax Reform, higher energy taxes were offset by 
reductions in workers’ and employers’ social security contributions.62 
The CCL’s financial impact is further assuaged by the enhanced capital allowances 
(ECAs) scheme, whereby investment in specific energy efficient products (e.g. 
pipework insulation and thermal screens) enables companies to reclaim 100% of 
the capital allowance in the first year. The ECAs are administered by the Carbon 
Trust, established in April 2001 as an independent, non profit-making company to 
recycle some £150 million of CCL receipts over three years to quicken the 
adoption of low carbon technologies.63 The Trust’s remit extends to provision of 
advice and information, research and demonstration projects. 
The main way energy intensive companies can manage their tax liability and 
improve environmental performance is through participation in the Climate Change 
Agreements (CC Agreements). An up to 80% discount from the Levy is available to 
companies that pursue challenging targets for improving energy efficiency or 
reducing carbon emissions through agreements negotiated between their relevant 
sector trade associations and the Secretary of State. The scheme is restricted to 
‘energy intensive’ industries, as defined in Parts A1 and A2 of Schedule 1 of the 
Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000.64 The 
agreements operate until 31 March 2013. To date, umbrella agreements with 44 
trade associations have been concluded, each association covering a plethora of 
individual businesses and some 8,000 industrial sites in all. Participants include 
the Brewers and Licensed Retailers Association; British Cement Association; 
 
Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Ltd; Food and Drink Federation; and 
British Apparel and Textiles Confederation.65 
The CC Agreements do not dictate how companies must achieve energy reduction 
and efficiency performance targets; rather, they detail the goals and methods for 
calculating performance, and reporting and verification protocols.66 Each sector has 
a target and a set of two-yearly milestones when performance is reviewed. Failure to 
meet agreed targets results in the Levy rebates being suspended or withdrawn. 
Parties that exceed their targets may trade their ‘credits’ with other businesses 
through the CETS, and may purchase allowances if necessary to meet target 
shortfalls. The Agreements are subject to five-yearly reviews and possible 
adjustments as a result of each review. 
4. Implementation of the Levy 
Implementation of the CCL can be evaluated against a variety of criteria, and the 
most important ones are economic impacts and environmental effects. On the 
environmental criterion, DEFRA estimated that the CCL package (including the CC 
Agreements)  would  save  5 MtCe  (million  tonnes  of  CO2   equivalent)  per  year  by 
2010.67 It appears CO2 emissions actually rose by 1.5% in 2001, supposedly due to 
more coal usage in power stations in response to higher gas prices.68 The Energy 
Minister, Brian Wilson, admitted in May 2002 that it appeared unlikely that Britain 
would reach its stepping-stone target of 5% of electricity generated from renewables 
by end of 2003.69 It is an altogether different but vital question, of course, whether 
such emission reduction and renewable energy targets are sufficient to avoid 
dangerous climate change. 
In terms of economic impacts—crucial to the political viability of the CCL—various 
commentators and industry groups made dire forecasts of the Levy’s impact on the 
private sector. A sensational report by Business Strategies (sponsored by steel, 
chemical and engineering industry associations), predicted the CCL would 
provoke 156,000 job losses over ten years, reduce UK manufacturing productivity 
 
by 0.8% and generally weaken UK international trade competitiveness.70 Various 
trade and industry periodicals carried similar alarmist predictions.71 As many UK 
companies had already supposedly made great strides in improving their energy 
and materials efficiency in order to stay in business, it was believed that the Levy 
would bankrupt many such firms at the margins of solvency.72 A contrasting view 
came from a study commissioned by the UK Worldwide Fund for Nature, which 
found that industries employing 93% of the UK workforce would either benefit 
from the CCL package or incur only a very slight net cost.73 It also pointed out that 
given recent falls in electricity prices, the CCL would merely restore such fuel prices 
to their levels of five years ago. 
Other studies highlighted possible regional and sector specific effects. The 
construction industry, services sector and the public sector would be net winners as 
they are relatively labour-intensive (thus benefiting from the NIC reductions) than 
energy-intensive. The chemical, plastics and steel industries are among industry 
sectors commentators predicted would be maligned by the CCL because of their 
high-energy needs and low staffing.74 However, such differences do not seem to 
account for the fact that energy intensive industries are eligible to receive an 
80% CCL rebate by participating in the CC Agreements. Apart from differential 
economic sector effects, there are also possible geographical variations in the 
impact of the CCL; Business Strategies predicted such regional disparities, with 
northern British manufacturers to be disproportionately affected because of their 
higher concentration of energy intensive companies.75 
Recently, evidence is emerging of the actual effects of the Levy. SGS Consulting 
surveyed 100 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in early 2002 on their reaction 
to the CCL.76 It found that 25% of enterprises were unaware that the Levy had come 
into force, and that almost a quarter of firms did not understand the Levy’s purpose 
or how its revenue was spent. Half of SME manufacturers reported that they believed 
the CCL would ultimately have a negative impact on their business against a quarter 
of respondents who believed that the Levy would have a net positive financial effect 
 
due to the NIC reductions. The SGS study found that 27% of SMEs had implemented 
a programme to monitor or manage their energy consumption, with installation of 
energy efficient lighting being the most popular method, although it was not clear 
whether such energy management measures were in direct response to the CCL. SGS 
Consulting suggested special measures were needed in the CCL package to directly 
assist SMEs because their size reduced their access to the CC Agreements or to 
Levy-exempt CHP fuels.77 
A second, more detailed study, conducted by the Federation of Small Businesses78 
found that 66% of SMEs were better off after the Levy due to the NIC reduction 
whilst remaining under the CCL exemption threshold because of their low energy 
usage.79 Of the 34% of  SMEs subject to the  Levy, FSB  concluded that 88% were 
financially worse off, with the main ‘losers’ being SMEs involved in plastics processing, 
hospitality and certain retailers.80 It gave as an example a plastic moulding company 
employing 35 staff that was unable to participate in a CC Agreement and incurred 
a net annual  loss of £6,875 due to the CCL.81 The FSB study was critical of the 
additional membership costs of participating in the CC Agreements.82 A third, 
shorter survey, conducted by London Electricity of professionals working in the energy 
industry, revealed that 42% of respondents felt the CCL had caused a net increase 
in their business’s costs and 33% did not believe that the CCL had prompted new 
energy management initiatives.83 Sixty per cent of respondents agreed that more 
guidance was needed on how to obtain and utilise renewable energy. 
Other insights into the Levy’s effects are coming from trade associations, industry 
publications and academic commentators. Some instances of significant energy 
savings have been reported among engineering businesses in response to the 
CCL.84 Studies suggest that most organisations can reduce their energy bills by up 
to 10– 20% through low or no cost measures.85 This can substantially offset the 
average 15% increase in the average industrial user’s annual electricity bill 
caused by the Levy, without taking into account the effects of the NIC reductions 
and Levy rebates. On the other hand, some companies appear to have 
 
experienced lengthy delays (and costs) in joining the CC Agreements because of 
insufficient information on eligibility criteria provided by authorities.86 
5. Survey of Northwest Businesses 
From July–September 2002, Chanwai undertook an exploratory investigation and 
conducted  questionnaires  delivered  by  site  visits,  telephone  and  email,  of  three 
sample groups of businesses and organisations in the Northwest of England, 
regarding their experience with the CCL and ancillary energy policies.87  This 
region has a major share of the UK’s heavy industry and thus would be expected 
to particularly affected by the CCL. The research was undertaken under the auspices 
of Sustainability Northwest in Manchester, which helped with choice of the survey 
samples and research logistics. The three samples were: an exploratory 
investigation of twelve major businesses and organisations involving interviews; a 
schedule list of questions delivered by telephone or site visit to six energy supply 
companies in the region; and a wider questionnaire survey of forty companies and 
organisations in the Northwest (the ‘wider population’), in order to assess whether 
the key issues identified in the first core sample group were consistent with those of 
the larger business community. The first sample group included a local council, an 
airport operator, several heavy manufacturing and engineering companies, 
financial institutions, and several firms in the retail and service sector.88 The 
questions covered inter alia respondents’ knowledge of the Levy; adoption of new 
energy management practices; the effects of the NIC reductions; and desired 
changes to the CCL regime. All respondents demonstrated  some  awareness  of  
the  workings  of  the  Levy,  ranging  from  a  ‘general awareness’ to an ‘in-depth 
knowledge’. Eleven of the twelve respondents already had in place policies and/or 
practices for energy efficiency and conservation prior to the Levy, including in 
several cases involving ISO 14001 registration. However, of the eleven businesses, 
four had not implemented additional energy management practices since the CCL 
and of those that had, five were doing so only because they were participating 
 
or applying to participate in a CC Agreement. 
The research pointed to the importance of the CC Agreements process rather than 
the Levy per se in driving efforts to control GHG emissions. However, a couple of 
firms commented that they had found the CC Agreement process ‘complex and 
costly’, due to obligations to identify, calculate and report emissions (e.g. energy per 
unit per product), and concerns that expenditure on installing energy measuring 
equipment might exceed the final value of the CCL rebate. Energy management 
practices adopted by these and other companies included designation of staff as 
energy managers and new energy house-keeping programmes (e.g. low energy light 
bulbs and voltage monitoring). Interestingly, only two companies had acted to source 
more of their electricity from renewable energy sources, and the one business with 
an existing CHP plant (CCL exempt) only operated it at half capacity because of its 
high cost. Several companies reported that their large size impeded effective delivery 
of new energy efficiency initiatives to dispersed offices and branches. An important 
selling point of the Levy was the off-setting employers’ NIC reductions, but none of 
the respondents disclosed any additional staff recruitment because of their lower 
payroll taxes. In two cases, firms admitted difficulties detecting and measuring any 
relationship between the financial effects of the Levy and the NIC changes because 
their energy budget and company payroll were managed by separate accounting 
systems. 
In terms of possible changes to the CCL regime, some respondents requested more 
and clearer information from the government on how to reduce their Levy liability 
through energy conservation actions. One company felt although there had been a 
proliferation of energy advice schemes, the result had only been confusion not clarity. 
Other respondents mentioned it would be preferable to receive up-front public grants 
rather than tax-deduction capital allowances to spur new investment in clean energy 
technologies. It was also mentioned that the ECAs should be amended to subsidise 
the running costs of new energy efficient investments. A couple of companies also 
complained that the CCL scheme should be adjusted to recognise prior environmental 
 
and energy performance improvements made by affected companies, although it was 
unclear how this could be implemented. 
The second sample surveyed six energy supply companies in terms of their reaction 
to the Levy (although it does not directly apply to them), and barriers they may 
have experienced to expanding CCL-exempt renewable energy generation. All the 
respondents professed a strong interest in expanding renewable energy supplies, 
although only two of the six cited increased consumer pressure for so doing. The 
main reason was the effect of the Renewables Obligation (RO). The RO was 
introduced through the Utilities Act 2000 (and took effect in 2002), obliging energy 
supply companies to increase their provision of renewable energy supply to 10.4% of 
total electricity supply by 2010.89 All the respondents reported two distinct barriers 
to expanding their supply of renewables. These were connecting green fuel sources 
to the national electricity grid and planning legislation restrictions to new energy 
projects such as wind farms. In several cases, respondents reported intransigence or 
hostility from local councils to renewable energy projects. Difficulties in obtaining 
development consents under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 reported by 
the respondents have also been cited in other studies.90 Regarding the electricity grid, 
several energy companies cited problems associated with the connection costs for new 
renewable energy supplies and, secondly, the difficulties of integrating small and 
intermittent electricity supplies to the New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
(NETA), introduced on 27 March 2001 as the framework for the wholesale electricity 
market in England and Wales.91 Under NETA, electricity suppliers and generators 
must contract directly with each other, and penalties are imposed where demand 
exceeds contracted levels or generation falls short of it. Through these market 
reforms, NETA sought to stimulate genuine competition into wholesale electricity 
trading and provide price reductions for consumers. But for small energy generators, 
whose supplies may be intermittent and less reliable, there is a danger of breaching 
contracted supply levels and so incurring heavy financial penalties.92 Due to the 
current price reductions from the NETA deregulation gas and electricity wholesale 
 
market, some respondents felt that certain renewable energy projects were not 
economically feasible, even apart from planning law and grid connection concerns. 
From the wider population of 40 business and organisations in the Northwest of 
England sampled,93 the findings were broadly consistent with the trends from the 
core group. Regarding companies’ knowledge of the workings of the CCL and how it 
affected their operations, 85% of respondents indicated a general awareness of the 
Levy, but were less knowledgeable of specific issues, such as who qualified as a ‘high 
energy intensive’ user (30% of respondents) for the purpose of CC Agreement 
participation. Regarding the effects of the NIC reduction, 55% of the 
respondents reported no net financial benefit. This appeared to be due to the 
characteristics of business’ operations and corporate structure, as well as reliance on 
separate accounting systems that obfuscate the relationship between energy bills 
and payroll taxes. 
A high 82% of respondents from the wider population sample admitted to making 
some energy management changes to their business operations before the Levy, and 
55% making changes after the Levy. Of both sets of changes, low cost, non-invasive 
measures were overwhelmingly favoured. Such a level of ‘voluntary’ action reflects 
practice in other jurisdictions such as Australia where the country’s national 
greenhouse challenge programme has focused on encouraging businesses to 
adopt ‘no regrets measures’—i.e. those that can be done profitably alone 
regardless of any additional environmental justification.94 Examples of measures 
adopted in the UK sample included subscription to voluntary environmental 
management systems (e.g. ISO 14001) and establishment of energy management 
teams. 
Changes made by respondents after the Levy showed a relative decrease in 
implementation of positive pro-action measures. Public organisations (e.g. local 
councils) showed a generally stronger commitment to invest in energy management 
measures than companies. Thirty per cent of respondents reported making ‘no’ 
changes in response to the CCL, compared to the 17% who made ‘no’ changes 
 
before the Levy. Of the companies and organisations making further energy 
management changes in response to the CCL, an increasing proportion of these 
changes were low cost rather than  high  cost  measures.  Some  respondents  
indicated  that  the  existence  of  preexisting energy conservation measures made 
additional changes superfluous (e.g. continuation of ISO 14001 accreditation). 
Overall, this may infer that companies and organisations  are currently  restrained  
by  financial  resources  from  implementing seemingly expensive reforms or that 
firms are currently focusing on picking the easy low hanging fruit (i.e. adopting ‘no 
cost’ actions) and postponing the costly measures. In responding to the CCL, the 
primary challenges reported by respondents related  to time and labour resource 
constraints. Some firms faced what were perceived as more pressing corporate 
priorities, and in any event indicated (42% of respondents) difficulties in 
disseminating new corporate energy policies and practices among their 
decentralised offices and branches. Given the prevalence of subsidiaries and franchise 
networks in modern corporate structures, it would seem that government 
environmental reforms should be increasingly sensitive to the form of corporate 
governance.95 Financial resources were also identified as a ‘challenge’ by 45% of 
the respondents, especially in relation to small firms. Fifty per cent of respondents 
stressed challenges related to inadequate media and government information on the 
Levy and the problem of accessing affordable renewable energy sources. Another 
challenge identified (40% of respondents) concerned the complexities of joining the 
CC Agreements scheme—some saw it as too technical to facilitate wider interest. 
A minority of respondents (17%) reported ‘no challenges’ in adapting to the Levy, 
perhaps inferring that some companies are simply uninterested in reducing an extra 
cost to their operations, or lack awareness of the connection between GHG emissions 
and corporate profitability. It also raises the fundamental question whether the CCL 
rate is too low and that the price differential between green and brown fuel is 
insufficient to influence polluters. Ways to improve the CCL regime mentioned by the 
wider population were consistent with the findings from the core sample. The 
 
following section explores how the CCL might be redesigned in the light of this 
and other research. 
6. Reforming Energy Taxation 
6.1 Redesigning the Climate Change Levy 
The use of energy pricing mechanisms to address GHG emissions appears set to 
remain  an  indelible  feature of  UK  environmental  regulation,  and  there are  good 
reasons that this should be so. Even critics of the CCL, such as the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI), have conceded that eco-taxes can when well designed produce 
positive environmental and economic results.96 The problem, however, is that 
environmental taxes do not always translate well into effective design. The UK 
has little experience in environmental taxes, and there is little extensive 
international experience to draw upon. The CCL should be seen as a somewhat 
experimental initiative, with adjustments necessary over the coming years to 
strengthen the financial incentives. This was the case with the energy taxes 
introduced in Scandinavia during the 1990s.97  The future of the CCL will also likely 
be shaped by EU level developments. Although the Commission has long abandoned 
plans for a carbon tax, it is continuing with  a  more  pragmatic  focus  on  energy  
products  taxes  based  on  extending  the existing system of excise duties and a 
gradual increase in existing levels of taxation.98 Existing literature suggests that 
properly designed eco-taxes can encourage polluting companies to reduce their 
emissions and invest in cleaner technologies and fuels.99 Chanwai’s research suggests 
that the effectiveness of incentive taxes depends partially on the existence of 
parallel reforms such as market restructuring to improve the supply of renewable 
energy fuels and provision of technical advice to companies interested in better 
managing their tax liabilities. The surveys disclosed that most energy 
management changes adopted by companies occurred before the Levy was 
introduced. The CCL experience suggests a much more mute, half-hearted and 
haphazard response than theory predicts. Apart from the give-ways available through 
 
the ECAs, evidence of companies ‘physically’ investing in cleaner machinery, as 
predicted by economic theory, remains to be widely seen. 
The economic literature also stresses the importance of eco-taxes reflecting 
environmental externality costs (in this case global warming) if they are to have a 
substantial influence on polluters’ behaviour.100 Unless there is a significant 
difference between the cost of brown and green energy, most industries are not 
going to make necessary radical changes in their operations towards sustainable 
energy systems. Quite simply, it must become more unprofitable to pollute and 
indulge in profligate energy consumption before widespread corporate changes can 
be expected. There is considerable scope for the Levy to be increased (but with 
corresponding NIC deductions or other concessions) given that over the past five 
years liberalisation of energy markets has resulted in major price reductions for 
British energy consumers. The academic literature also advocates ecological tax 
reform as providing a more holistic approach for addressing the inter-relationships 
between economic and environmental factors. The UK has made tentative steps 
towards ecological tax reform, first with the Landfill Tax and now with the CCL. 
Chanwai’s research suggests that in relation to the Levy, the  reform has been too 
tentative and the NIC reductions have not imparted a sufficiently tangible signal to 
companies to recruit extra staff whilst striving to reduce taxed energy use. A 
contributing factor to the muted effect of the NIC reduction is that many 
organisations reported maintaining separate payroll and energy cost accounting 
systems, thus impeding recognition of the inter-relationships between the two. Also 
relevant is that large, decentralised companies found it difficult to measure such 
financial changes. This suggests that eco-tax reform may unravel where reformers 
treat corporations as homogenous entities, and so fail to develop policies or 
mechanisms to ensure that the message of financial incentives can be effectively 
disseminated through large businesses. Reforms to integrate corporate 
environmental and financial reporting are one promising avenue by which the latter 
two problems could be addressed.101 
 
The opportunity for certain energy-intensive industries to obtain high CCL rebates 
through participation in the CC Agreements also warrants review. Some industries 
surveyed felt unjustly excluded from the Agreements. To qualify for the rebates, an 
industry must be subject to the EU’s IPPC Directive as incorporated in the Pollution 
Prevention and Control Act 1999. However, the IPPC regime was designed to control 
industrial pollution and only indirectly addresses the energy intensity of industry. It 
would appear that for primarily reasons of administrative convenience the 
government chose to use IPPC coverage to define eligibility to participate in the CC 
Agreements. 
Another problematic feature of the CCL concerns the distribution of CCL revenues 
recycled between NIC reductions and subsidies for energy efficiency investments. 
Initially the government proposed a 0.5% NIC reduction coupled with a £50 fund to 
support energy efficiency investments, but this was later altered to a 0.3% NIC 
reduction and a £150 million fund in response to business lobbying. In 1999, the 
House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee recommended doubling the 
amount of direct funding for energy efficiency  under the CCL.102 There appears to 
be  no substantive rationale for the basis of the current distribution, which should 
be carefully reviewed. 
Apart from these ‘fine-tuning’ reforms, there are some very fundamental questions 
about the structure and scope of the CCL that warrant addressing. The CCL is 
essentially an industrial energy tax, rather than a carbon tax levied on the carbon 
content of fuels. Chanwai’s research has revealed that energy suppliers’ motivations 
to expand their supply of renewable energy has come mainly from the RO and not 
consumer pressure from CCL-taxed businesses. The RCEP favoured the CCL being 
in the form of an upstream (i.e. on energy suppliers) carbon-based tax to enable 
GHG emissions at source to be directly addressed, and it dismissed as overstated the 
administrative complexities of this option suggested by the Lord Marshall Report.103 
The House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee was critical of the decision 
of the government to favour an energy over a carbon tax, which it saw motivated by 
 
a desire to protect the struggling coal industry which would be hurt most by a pure 
carbon tax.104 There are advantages and disadvantages associated with each form of 
tax and whether a tax should be upstream or downstream (i.e. on consumers). The 
main argument for an energy tax on consumers over a carbon tax in that it should 
better promote energy efficient technologies. But an upstream carbon tax  would 
involve fewer taxable entities than an energy consumption tax, and therefore less 
fiscal supervision and lower regulatory compliance costs.105 In an EU context, where 
Member States trade in electricity, there could be an advantage in adopting a carbon 
tax levied on refined fuel products at the point of consumption as such fuel excises 
make it easier to attribute tax revenues to the country of final sale. Of the tax 
schemes already adopted by European countries, none are pure carbon taxes. 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden’s taxes are assessed on the average carbon content 
of fuels with lower rates or exemptions for specific fuels or economic sectors. In 
Finland and the Netherlands, the tax is based on both carbon content and energy 
content. More detailed research into the relative advantages of carbon and energy 
taxation should be commissioned by UK authorities to assess better the arguments 
and existing experience. 
There is also the contentious question of how high a carbon or energy tax should be 
pitched. The effectiveness of the CCL may have been undermined by significant 
declines of up to 40% in wholesale electricity prices since 1998.106 According to standard 
economic theory, the ideal carbon tax should be priced to achieve the economically 
optimal amount of GHG emissions at which the economic costs and benefits of 
reducing emissions by an extra tonne are equalised. But research also suggests there 
are huge uncertainties involved in modelling carbon taxes.107 Moreover, as global 
warming involves complex ethical issues and is plagued by considerable scientific 
uncertainty, determining an optimal level of GHG emissions (and hence climate change) 
for the purposes of eco-tax design is fraught with difficulty. Furthermore, research 
on the price elasticises of demand for energy suggest that such elasticises are low, 
implying that a very large energy tax is necessary to engender reductions in energy 
 
use.108 Yet, some eco-taxes may achieve highly elastic polluter responses; for example, 
the tax differential introduced between leaded and unleaded petrol in many countries 
including the UK was followed by rapid fuel substitution.109 Furthermore, a politically 
acceptable, small carbon tax could nonetheless change perceptions about the future, 
influencing investment strategies that determine long-term GHG emission trends. 
6.2 Emissions Trading and Taxing the Domestic and Transport Sectors 
The question of the relationship between the CCL and the pilot emissions trading 
scheme must also be eventually resolved. Should both operate concurrently, or should 
the UK opt for a single economic instrument to promote sustainable energy use? 
There is substantial economic literature devoted to arguing the relative merits of 
taxation versus marketable permits to control pollution. The essential difference is 
that whereas taxes set a ‘price’ on environmental use and rely on the market to 
effect corresponding behavioural changes towards the desired environmental goal, 
tradeable permits are based on government determining the environmental goal (in 
the form of an emissions ‘cap’) and relying on the market to price and allocate the 
tradeable entitlements.110 Whilst a tax instrument offers predictable costs (e.g. tax 
per unit of fuel), the resulting environmental performance can be uncertain; for 
example, the tax may be too low to encourage industries to reduce emissions. 
Alternatively, trading within a cap offers certainty of emission levels (i.e. the total 
number of tradeable pollution allowances equals the deemed sustainable pollution 
load), but the resulting compliance costs will vary by firm depending on a business’s 
efficiency. These arguments have been considered by governments in relation to 
controlling GHG emissions, with some preference for a trading mechanism, partly 
because it would allow environmental groups to participate and withhold 
allowances.111 
But a key weakness with tradeable permits is that they are not easily adapted to 
situations involving numerous, small polluters, such as motor vehicles and 
households.112 The market transaction costs are usually too high to integrate such 
smaller polluters in a trading scheme, which is better suited to a market of a 
 
few major, heavy polluters. Furthermore, a tax has the advantage that its 
revenues can fund compensation for low-income families or businesses 
vulnerable to higher energy prices and help finance development of low-emission 
technologies. Therefore, a combination of energy taxation and tradeable emission 
allowances may be most appropriate solution for the UK, with the CCL focusing on 
smaller polluters and tradeable emissions permits allocated to heavy industry. 
Such a scenario would entail a major overhaul of the CCL regime. Arguably a 
major weakness with the CCL is the exemption to the polluting transport and 
household sectors. Some of the respondents interviewed in Chanwai’s research 
saw the CCL as unfair because of this exemption. The European Commission earlier 
advised EU Member  States that in responding  to the Kyoto targets, governments 
should introduce policy measures that tackled all sectors, especially transport and 
households.113 Road transport dominates British emissions, although civil aircraft 
and shipping contribute increasingly. Whilst the UK appears on course to meet its 
Kyoto goal, this is only a modest start and does not reflect the very substantial 
GHG emission cuts needed to avoid dangerous climate change. The Levy in its 
current form will almost certainly not enable such long-term emission reductions. It 
may need to extend to petroleum products and be substantially increased, with 
CCL revenues from the private transport sector recycled into public transport 
investments. The recent company car tax reform is a positive initiative and is 
helping to encourage a switch to more fuel-efficient vehicles.114 As public  tolerance 
of higher motoring charges is fragile, extending the CCL to private transport would 
require hypothecating the additional Levy revenues specifically for public transport 
improvements. 
For the household sector, one challenge resides in building more energy efficient 
housing and renovating existing premises to incorporate heat and light saving 
measures. The government has introduced a package of soft incentive and 
regulatory measures in this area, but more work is needed.115 Households’ share 
of UK final energy consumption is 29%, second only to transport, and its 
 
quantity of energy consumption has ballooned by more than 25% since the early 
1970s because of population growth and changing housing patterns.116 The RCEP 
has argued: ‘the government is mistaken in keeping domestic  fuel cheap for all 
households in order to help a minority of households who suffer from fuel poverty 
. . . there should not . . . be a blanket exemption for households from taxation 
measures aimed at limiting climate change’.117  The RCEP felt that the political and 
social objections to such a move could be overcome by careful recycling of Levy 
revenues to fuel poverty groups such as pensioners and the unemployed. Already, 
in 1994, the UK government ended VAT zero-rating on domestic energy, but 
eventually settled on a reduced VAT rate of 5%. Ultimately, the CCL has a future 
role in Britain’s GHG emission control efforts, but perhaps a role different to that 
envisaged by reformers. There is certainly scope to adjust technical features of the 
CCL regime, as our research has revealed. But beyond this, more serious reforms 
are needed. The role of emissions trading is one area. Extending the CCL to 
motorists and households is another. The danger, however, is that short-term 
political considerations will displace longer-term strategic thinking. The 
government’s recent decision to bail out British Energy and talk of exempting 
nuclear power from the CCL reflects the continuing substantial political obstacles 
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